

November 22, 2019

VIA Intervention Comment Form

Mr. Claude Doucet
Secretary General
Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N2

Dear Mr. Doucet,

**Subject: Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2019-57: Call for Further Comments
– Review of Mobile services**

1. Pursuant to Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2019-57, Review of mobile wireless services (TNC 2019-57), paragraph 55, the Canadian Communication Systems Alliance (“CCSA”) submits these Further Comments.
2. These Further Comments represent the views of CCSA members with the exception of Tbaytel which will be filing a submission directly with the Commission.

Executive Summary

1. In these Further Comments, CCSA recommends that MVNO RAN access be mandated with certain specific elements:
 - Full MVNOs should be permitted to obtain RAN capacity or access from MNOs notwithstanding the fact that MVNOs do not have RAN access to offer in return;
 - the need for mandated RAN access should apply to SaskTel;
 - Full MVNOs should be permitted to re-sell wholesale services; and
 - both tariffs and standard agreements, approved by the Commission, should be included in the regulatory framework.

2. There is no evidence that implementation of mandated MVNO wholesale access will significantly reduce the incumbents' investment in wireless networks. Rather, as the Chen report suggests, there are good reasons to believe that such a regime will actually stimulate such investment.
3. As CNOC has pointed out, we have seen threats of reduced investment by the incumbents at many stages of the decades-long process of opening competition in the provision of telecommunications services. Such threats have “have never, not once, come to pass”.
4. The Commission should not hesitate to carry on the process of opening competition in all aspects of the telecommunications sector to the benefit – as has proven the case many times before – of all Canadian telecommunications customers.

CCSA thanks the Commission for the opportunity to provide these comments.

Sincerely,



Christopher J. Edwards
Vice-President, Regulatory Affairs

CANADIAN COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS ALLIANCE INC.

**Before the Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission**

Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2019-57

Review of mobile wireless services

Further Comments

November 22, 2019

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Introduction

5. The Canadian Communication Systems Alliance (CCSA) files these Further Comments pursuant to Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2019-57, Review of mobile wireless services (TNC 2019-57).
6. CCSA represents more than 110 communications companies operating in Canada that each own transmission facilities to provide broadcasting and telecommunications services in communities from sea to sea to sea.
7. In large part, the serving areas of those companies are rural or remote and CCSA members are often the only available alternative to incumbent service providers.
8. The Commission commenced its review of mobile wireless services to ensure that its regulatory framework remains relevant, that the communications needs of Canadians be met in an evolving communications environment and that the over-arching policy objectives of the *Act* are achieved.¹
9. With the benefit of information provided by parties in their Initial Comments and responses to the Commission's Requests for Information, these Further Comments refine the recommendations regarding an appropriate and effective regulatory framework which CCSA provided in its May 15, 2019 Comments.
10. CCSA believes that its proposed revisions to the regulatory framework will enhance wireless competition, provide more and better wireless prices and options for Canadians, and achieve the objectives of Section 7 of The *Act*.
11. For the reasons set out in this submission, CCSA considers that its recommendation of a framework which supports competitive entry by Full MVNOs, as defined by the Commission, is consistent with the policy objective of encouraging investment in

¹ Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2019-57 at para. 3.

wireless network facilities for the benefit of all Canadians.

12. In these Further Comments, CCSA clarifies its views and recommendations on a number of matters that are of great importance to the independent telecommunications providers it represents and the Canadians customers they serve. Those matters include:
 - a. the nature of wholesale RAN access required by MVNOs;
 - b. the need for mandated RAN access to apply to SaskTel;
 - c. the need to mandate that MVNOs are permitted to re-sell wholesale services; and
 - d. the need for Standard Wholesale Services Agreements.

13. CCSA also offers brief additional comments on two of the central issues in this proceeding, namely:
 - a. the investment distinctive fallacy; and
 - b. the alignment of the Commission’s regulatory regime with the Policy Directions.

CCSA’s Objectives

14. As CCSA has made clear in numerous submissions over the years, its members generally have been unable to obtain any form of wholesale access to wireless services or facilities from the national MNOs.

15. As a result, most CCSA members have been unable to add a mobile wireless communications component to their service portfolios. In plain terms, this failure of access has prevented Canadians in the communities CCSA members serve from being able to choose a competitive “quad play” service as an alternative to the locally-available incumbent.

16. In today’s environment, consumers have a strong expectation that their service providers’ retail offerings will permit them to use their mobile devices to access video, voice and data.

17. To the extent that independent TSPs are unable to offer such mobile service elements, their ability to compete for customers is severely impaired. That impairment – and the resulting lack of alternative “full service” providers – is a detriment to Canadians in the communities that CCSA members serve who are currently deprived of the benefits of robust competition in wireless services.
18. That constraint on competition and its negative impact on Canadians is contrary to the objectives of both the Federal Government and the Commission to encourage competitive entry, to promote greater price competition and, as a result, to create a more dynamic market for the benefit of consumers.
19. To remove that competitive constraint, CCSA submits the Commission should implement a framework which 1) encourages competitive entry by Full MVNOs by establishing that they are able to purchase RAN access from the MNOs at just and reasonable tariffed wholesale rates and terms; and 2) authorizes those Full MVNOs to re-sell to other providers. Such a competitive framework would:
 - a. provide CCSA’s larger members the opportunity to offer their communities increased choice in mobile services as Full MVNOs ; and
 - b. provide other CCSA members who lack the resources to turn up a Full MVNO operation to offer their communities a new “lighter” MVNO option, based on the purchase of wholesale services from new Full MVNOs.
20. In those respects, CCSA supports the analysis and recommendations made by the Canadian Network Operators Consortium (CNOC) in its May 15, 2019 Initial Comments.²

² Canadian Network Operators Consortium Inc., “Telecom Notice Of Consultation CRTC 2019-57, Review Of Mobile Wireless Services, 28 February 2019, Intervention Of Canadian Network Operators Consortium Inc.”, 15 May 2019 [hereinafter *CNOC Initial Comment*].

The Nature of Wholesale RAN Access Required by MVNOs

21. CCSA requests that the Commission direct the national MNOs to file proposed tariffs under which they must provide Full MVNOs with access to the national MNOs' RANs at just and reasonable rates.
22. Many of the details of the network arrangements between the national MNOs and between the national MNOs and regional MNOs are filed in confidence. CCSA is not aware of the specific terms of such arrangements.
23. However, information disclosed by TELUS in this proceeding provides a description of the RAN access arrangements it has in different parts of Canada. That description is similar, if not identical to, the arrangements requested by CCSA.
24. TELUS' explanation of its use of Bell Mobility's RAN includes this: "...each party invests in, owns and operates its own network, but in some places, TELUS obtains RAN capacity from Bell and pays for that capacity."³ Bell also pays for RAN capacity from TELUS but that there is no joint ownership of the RAN and, in the case of TELUS, it owns 100% of its core networks across Canada.⁴
25. CCSA submits that this is the same access arrangement which TELUS and other national MNOs should provide to Full MVNOs. Full MVNOs with their own wireless networks, including the core networks, should, as TELUS says about the arrangement between it and Bell, be permitted to lease "RAN capacity" from the national MNOs and "pay for that capacity".⁵
26. To date, TELUS has provided a wireless access arrangement to Bell and has refused to provide the same arrangement to competitors. TELUS' arrangement with Bell has existed

³ Response to TELUS(CRTC)24May19-206, Attachment 9, page 2. Attachment 9 is a response to an RFI identified as TELUS(CRTC)3March14-8.

⁴ Response to TELUS(CRTC)24May19-206, Attachment 9, pages 1-2.

⁵ Response to TELUS(CRTC)24May19-206, Attachment 9, page 2.

for many years and is documented. It is clear from TELUS' RFI responses that the RAN capacity national MNOs lease from each other will be a critical element for the success of their own wireless services well into the future.

27. TELUS' description of network sharing with Bell is a concise definition of roaming. TELUS states:

...we have designed and built our HSPA and LTE networks in a manner that allows for a seamless experience for customers when their mobile devices are engaged through TELUS antennas and then are engaged through Bell's antennas. However, this virtual sharing is not actual network sharing and the agreements that govern these network access arrangements clearly indicate that the parties are each building out their own network assets. Indeed, the parties even adopted the colloquial term "Network Sharing" as a defined term in the NGNRA to refer to the reciprocal purchase and sale on RAN capacity on each other's networks...⁶

28. TELUS' refusal to permit Full MVNOs access to its RAN on terms similar to its arrangement with Bell – an arrangement "that allows for a seamless experience for customers" – amounts to unjust discrimination contrary to section 27(2) of the *Act*.
29. As matters stand today, Full MVNOs have little chance of obtaining radio spectrum for their own RANs. It is important to note that the reciprocal arrangements between TELUS and Bell do not require that the other party have a certain level of investment in spectrum or the RAN. In practice, those companies lease each other RAN capacity regardless of the relative level of incurred or forecast spectrum and RAN investments each party bears.
30. That is, there is no explicit threshold or test for TELUS or Bell to satisfy before leasing RAN capacity to each other. Neither should such requirements be imposed upon Full MVNOs. Indeed, the absence of a "home" RAN and the inability to obtain one are not reasons to foreclose Full MVNOs from leasing capacity. Rather, they are reasons why such access must be provided.
31. The sharing agreement between TELUS and SaskTel is explained by TELUS as follows:

⁶ Response to TELUS(CRTC)24May19-206, Attachment 9, page 2.

SaskTel sells RAN capacity on its HSPA and LTE networks to TELUS and Bell in return for an enhanced roaming arrangement on TELUS' and Bell's HSPA and LTE networks across Canada.⁷

32. It is apparent that TELUS leases RAN capacity from SaskTel in return for network functionality other than RAN capacity on its own network. The exchange of enhanced roaming for RAN access is an example of an exchange where one party obtains use of the RAN and the other party does not.
33. Similarly, Full MVNOs should be permitted to obtain RAN capacity or access from MNOs notwithstanding the fact that MVNOs do not have RAN access to offer in return.

The Need for Mandated RAN Access to Apply to SaskTel

34. In these comments, CCSA has requested that the Commission require national MNOs to provide Full MVNOs with access to their RAN facilities.
35. As is stated at paragraph 103 of CCSA's Initial Comments, CCSA considers that the regulation of wholesale MVNO access services should be at the national level and should not impose differing regulatory requirements on the basis of geographic divisions within the country.⁸
36. Having said that, although the Commission does not recognize Sasktel as a "national MNO" *per se*, the Commission should extend the same wholesale access obligations to SaskTel as it does to the "national MNOs".
37. SaskTel is unique among the regional MNOs. Its network coverage is more extensive within the province than any other MNO. It has the largest LTE network in

⁷ Response to TELUS(CRTC)24May19-206, Attachment 9, page 2.

⁸ Note that paragraph 12 of the Executive Summary of CCSA's Initial Comments mistakenly summarized CCSA's position as being that "the relevant market for provision of wholesale mobile wireless services should be provincial and MVNO wholesale access services should be mandated at that level" [emphasis added]. That comment was intended to convey CCSA's view of the relevant geographic market for the provision of retail services, a point that is addressed in the body of CCSA's Initial Comments.

Saskatchewan, covering 99% of the residents⁹, and has a mobile wireless network with more than four times the number of antenna sites as the next closest MNO, Rogers.¹⁰

38. As noted above, SaskTel provides TELUS with RAN capacity on SaskTel's HSPA and LTE networks.¹¹ If the same is also true for Bell, it suggests that those two national MNOs own little or no RAN facilities in Saskatchewan.
39. CCSA is not in a position to assess to what extent Bell and TELUS rely on SaskTel's RAN exclusively to provide their services as opposed to reliance on their own RAN facilities in Saskatchewan. If Bell and/or TELUS do own and control their own RANs in the province then it is important to determine the extent of that ownership or control.
40. Without more information, CCSA cannot determine if RAN access from Bell and TELUS is sufficient to support Full MVNOs operations in Saskatchewan. CCSA believes that, under existing conditions and arrangements, sufficient wholesale access to RAN facilities needed to offer Full MNVO service in Saskatchewan is not available from Bell or TELUS.
41. If that is the case then SaskTel should be required to provide MVNO access under the same terms and conditions as would apply to the “national MNOs”.
42. A framework to regulate the provision of wholesale mobile wireless services at a national level must provide for MVNO competition in all regions of the country.
43. To make the point more concrete, Access Communications of Regina is one of CCSA's largest members and one of the members most capable of investing in and turning up its own Full MVNO operation.
44. The regulatory framework should not foreclose that opportunity.

⁹ SaskTel 2018/19 Annual Report, page 49.

¹⁰ Data from ISED's Spectrum Management System, <https://sms-sgs.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/sms-sgs-prod.nsf/eng/home>

¹¹ Response to TELUS(CRTC)24May19-206, Attachment 9, page 2.

45. Assuming that sufficient wholesale access to RAN facilities needed to offer Full MNVO service in Saskatchewan is not available from the “national MNOs”, CCSA recommends that SaskTel be mandated to provide RAN access to Full MVNOs.

The Need to Mandate that MVNOs are Permitted to Re-sell Wholesale Services

46. It is critically important that the Commission require the MNOs to permit resale of RAN access and associated wholesale services and that the right to resell wholesale services be expressly included in the MNOs' RAN access tariffs.
47. Dynamic telecom markets are characterized by a mix of different types of providers. Service providers range from facilities-based to resellers in most competitive telecom service markets.
48. Generally, telecommunications competitors provide services through a mix of owned and leased equipment and facilities.
49. In the wireline space, for example, the market comprises a range of competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) that the Commission classifies by type depending on the degree they rely on third parties for their capabilities.¹²
50. A mix of competitors is also required for the wireless market. In referring to MNOs, MVNOs and resellers, the Commission noted "a mix of competitors has not developed to the degree that the Commission had expected in 2015".¹³
51. The need for – and the benefits of – resale of wholesale services have been affirmed many times. In 1999, the Commission determined that the resale of wholesale high speed access services would promote competition in the retail Internet services market. The

¹² The types of CLECs and their respective obligations are summarized at <https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/comm/telecom/eslcclec.htm>

¹³ Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2019-57 at para. 37.

Commission reiterated that finding in 2018.¹⁴ Similar findings were made with respect to local competition¹⁵ and co-location access¹⁶ wholesale services.

52. In 2017, after conducting a review of competition in the wireless market, the Commission determined that it was not the time to mandate RAN access.¹⁷ However, the Commission also said that it:

. . . fully supports a vibrant and diverse competitive landscape that includes a mix of facilities-based competitors and resellers, and is of the view that strong facilities-based competition should naturally result in more opportunities for resale competition, such as through the sale of excess network capacity or through differentiation strategies.¹⁸

53. From CCSA's point of view, the ability of competitive MVNOs to re-sell services purchased at wholesale from the MNOs is a doorway to competitive entry by various forms of "lighter" MVNOs, many of whom will continue to invest in their broadband access networks and other elements of the "core networks" needed to offer retail mobile wireless services.
54. That prospect is of great interest to all of CCSA's members who, today, remain unable to offer their customers a full "quad play" service.
55. CCSA foresees, as a by-product of the encouragement of competitive entry by Full MVNOs, an associated growth in the availability of wireless network services, systems and equipment from MVNE providers.
56. CCSA envisions a marketplace in which many independent communications distributors will be able to offer mobile wireless services by sourcing wholesale service elements

¹⁴ Telecom Decision CRTC 99-8, "Regulation under the Telecommunications Act of Cable Carriers' access services" paragraph 50 and Telecom Decision CRTC 2018-458, "Frontier Networks Inc. – Application regarding the refusal of Eastlink to allow Frontier to resell high-speed access services", paragraph 39.

¹⁵ Telecom Decision CRTC 97-8, "Local Competition", paragraph 240.

¹⁶ Telecom Decision CRTC 97-15, "Co-location", paragraph 29.

¹⁷ In Order in Council P.C. 2017-0557, dated June 1, 2017, Telecom Decision 2017-56 was referred back to the Commission for reconsideration.

¹⁸ Telecom Decision CRTC 2018-97, Reconsideration of Telecom Decision 2017-56 regarding final terms and conditions for wholesale mobile wireless roaming service, paragraph 116.

from a combination of Full MVNOs and MVNEs.

57. Nothing in that vision poses a risk to the MNOs' continued investment in their own wireless networks.
58. Rather, the independent operators' ability to innovate in the unique – and, often rural, remote and highly localized – markets they serve will bring new service options and alternatives to Canadian consumers in those markets.
59. Also important is the ability of MVNO competitors – and, for that matter, regional MNOs – to generate additional revenues from the sale of wholesale services to such “lighter” MVNOs. That ability directly supports the economic case for entry by Full MVNOs.
60. For all of those reasons, a framework which permits Full MVNOs to re-sell wholesale services, including RAN access and capacity, is entirely consistent with the objectives of increased facilities investment and the encouragement of “a vibrant and diverse competitive landscape that includes a mix of facilities-based competitors and resellers”.
61. To ensure that a healthy mix of facilities-based competitors and resellers does, in fact, emerge from mandated RAN access, CCSA asks the Commission to expressly permit the resale of services and facilities associated with RAN access and that the national MNOs be directed to file tariffs which state that such resale is permitted.

The Need for Standard Wholesale Services Agreements

62. With respect to the provision of wholesale services to competitors in the wireline telecommunications sector, it has been a common practice to define and mandate the use of standard agreements for the provision of such services while retaining the option for parties to negotiate their own commercial terms. Often, such standard agreements have been developed through the agency of an appropriate CISC working group.¹⁹

¹⁹ See, for example, Order CRTC 2001-92, "Terms and rates approved for large cable carriers' higher speed access service - Follow-up to Order CRTC 2000-789", Telecom Decision CRTC 2011-574, " CISC Business Process Working Group – Consensus report BPRE070a regarding Type III and Type IV CLEC agreement requirements",

63. Such standard-form agreements serve the important purposes of acting both as a backstop for negotiations and a common basis for the resolution of disputes that may arise from time to time.
64. Such standard-form agreements are needed because the new entrant is typically at an overwhelming disadvantage in its negotiation with the incumbent MNOs.
65. A new entrant will typically have stringent time and resource constraints to complete a given project with the result that delays and obfuscation can be applied by the incumbent to frustrate competitive entry altogether.
66. The incumbent, on the other hand, typically has dedicated staff for inter-carrier projects, tends to be more knowledgeable about the complex subject matter of the negotiation and is, at best, ambivalent about supporting the new entrant's project.
67. Mandated access rarely provides the incumbent with a sufficient incentive to move quickly. Rather, history tells us that delay almost always benefits the incumbent.
68. A standard agreement should set out the minimum requirements for each party, as reflected in the Commission's policies and directives. Properly drafted, it can significantly reduce the time needed to conclude terms for provision of wholesale services and, thereby accelerate competitive entry into the market.
69. The use of commonly understood terms and conditions minimizes the potential for delays associated with disagreements over the meaning or interpretation of Commission policies.
70. Mandated use of such standard services agreements has assisted the Commission to resolve disputes in a consistent manner and to prevent occurrences of unjust

Decision CRTC 98-8, "Local Pay Telephone Competition", Decision CRTC 2001-667, "Telecom Decision CRTC 97-8, Local competition, dated 1 May 1997: Follow-up process - CRTC Interconnection Steering Committee consensus items".

discrimination and undue preference between carriers.²⁰

71. National MNOs retain market power over the RAN and that market power can be used in a great many ways to prevent or forestall competitive entry. For this reason, both tariffs and standard agreements, approved by the Commission, must be included in the regulatory framework.

The Facilities Disinvestment Fallacy

72. The Commission has expressed concern over the possibility that MNOs could be discouraged from future investments if MVNOs are permitted to enter the market.
73. As many parties have noted, the MNOs have good reasons to continue investment in wireless networks and competitive reasons are foremost. Quite simply, if an MNO does not roll out wireless services in a given area or deploy new technologies, another MNO will take the opportunity to serve customers.
74. The competing MNO will invest in facilities and equipment because, by being the first mover, it stands to attract a large portion of potential customers.
75. That prime mover position is a key and durable competitive advantage: it is well understood that keeping a customer already won is far less expensive than winning a new customer.
76. Moreover, CCSA reiterates the conclusion of the initial Chen Report, in whose creation it participated, as follows:

. . . mandated wholesale MVNO access at regulated rates is unlikely to reduce investments by the national wireless carriers. To the contrary, it could very possibly stimulate their investments because the entry of MVNOs into the retail markets will likely increase the number of mobile wireless subscriptions.

²⁰ Telecom Decision CRTC 2007-129, "Forbearance with respect to certain inter-carrier agreements filed pursuant to section 29 of the *Telecommunications Act*", paragraphs 14,

Compared with the benchmark scenario, there will likely be a larger demand for network capacity.²¹

77. Many competing studies and analyses have been filed by parties to this proceeding regarding the possible impacts to MNO network investment that might arise from mandating MVNO access. As is appropriate in an evidence-based inquiry, the Commission must discharge the task of weighing those competing analyses.
78. However we do wish to emphasize and agree with CNOC’s point, in its Initial Comments, as follows:

CNOC urges the Commission not to be dissuaded by what it expects will be the usual chorus of Incumbent fear-mongering claiming that any form of mandated wholesale access will remove their incentives to invest and plunge Canada into a telecommunications Dark Ages.

79. CNOC continues:

These threats have been made in every regulatory proceeding going back to the introduction of competition in the early 1990s. They have never, not once, come to pass.²²

80. That is a statement of fact and, as such, it should not be overlooked as an extremely important piece of evidence in this proceeding.

Alignment of the Commission’s Regulatory Regime with the Policy Directions

81. The 2019 Policy Direction²³ provides that “the Commission should consider how its decisions can promote competition, affordability, consumer interests and innovation, in particular the extent to which they”, among other things:

²¹ Chen, Zhiqi, “An Economic Analysis of Mandated Wholesale Access for MVNOs and Competition in the Mobile Wireless Telecommunications Industry in Canada”, May 10, 2019 at para.74.

²² *CNOC Initial Comment* at para. 203.

²³ Order Issuing a Direction to the CRTC on Implementing the Canadian Telecommunications Policy Objectives to Promote Competition, Affordability, Consumer Interests and Innovation, SOR/2019-0227.

- encourage all forms of competition and investment,
- ensure that affordable access to high-quality telecommunications services is available in all regions of Canada, including rural areas,
- reduce barriers to entry into the market and to competition for telecommunications service providers that are new, regional or smaller than the incumbent national service providers,
- enable innovation in telecommunications services, including new technologies and differentiated service offerings.

82. As CCSA has stated above, the regulatory framework which CCSA recommends would:

- provide CCSA’s larger members the opportunity to offer their communities increased choice in mobile services as Full MVNOs by accessing the MNOs’ RANs at affordable tariffed wholesale rates (which, in turn, would promote their investment in their own wireless facilities); and
- provide other CCSA members who lack the resources to turn up a Full MVNO operation to offer their communities a new “lighter” MVNO option, based on the purchase of wholesale services from new Full MVNOs.

83. CCSA’s members operate networks and serve customers in many communities throughout Canada that do not attract focussed investment from the national MNOs.

84. Many such communities lack any competitive, differentiated alternative for mobile wireless services. In the vast majority of cases, CCSA members who serve those communities remain unable to offer a “quad play” service to their customers.

85. While CCSA appreciates that sustained investment in wireless networks is an important objective, so, too, is investment in all broadband networks, including the terrestrial networks that many CCSA members operate in the rural, remote and high-cost serving areas.

86. The ability of such companies to include mobile wireless services in their offerings will improve those companies' ability to invest to improve and extend the reach of their broadband networks.
87. Such a result would be significant contribution to Canada's ability to extend broadband connectivity to Canadians in many of Canada's most challenging telecommunications markets.
88. By providing mobile wireless service alternatives in their communities – where no such alternatives currently exist – those companies can contribute to the affordability of service and to the availability of differentiated service offerings for their customers.
89. The 2019 Policy Direction requires the Commission to encourage “all forms of competition and investment” and to ensure that affordable service is available “in all regions of Canada, including rural areas”.
90. CCSA's recommendations are entirely consistent with those requirements.

Conclusion

91. In summary, CCSA recommends that MVNO RAN access be mandated with certain specific elements:
 - Full MVNOs should be permitted to obtain RAN capacity or access from MNOs notwithstanding the fact that MVNOs do not have RAN access to offer in return;
 - mandated RAN access should apply to SaskTel;
 - Full MVNOs should be permitted to re-sell wholesale services; and
 - both tariffs and standard agreements, approved by the Commission, should be included in the regulatory framework.

92. There is no evidence that implementation of mandated MVNO wholesale access will significantly reduce the incumbents' investment in wireless networks. Rather, as the Chen Report concludes, such a regime may actually stimulate such investment.
93. As CNOC has pointed out, we have seen threats of reduced investment by the incumbents at many stages of the decades-long process of opening competition in the provision of telecommunications services. Such threats have “have never, not once, come to pass”.
94. The Commission should not hesitate to carry on the process of opening competition in all aspects of the telecommunications sector to the proven benefit of all Canadian telecommunications customers.

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